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Abstract:  In the 1950s and 60s, Alexander Gerschenkron claimed that banks facilitate
economic growth among “backward” countries.  In 1990s and 2000s, many theorists similarly
claim that banks promote growth.  Banks do so by their superior monitoring and screening
capabilities, they reason.  Through those capabilities, banks reduce informational asymmetries and
the attendent moral hazard and adverse selection, and thereby improve the allocation of credit.
As a fast-growth but allegedly bank-centered economy, Japan plays an important part in
these discussions of finance and growth.  In early 20th century Japan firms relied heavily on bank
debt, observers argue.  Those firms with preferential access to debt outperformed the others, and
those that were part of the zaibatsu corporate groups obtained that preferential access through their
affiliated banks.
With data from the first half of the century, we ask whether Japanese banks performed
the roles Gerschenkron and modern theorists assign them.  Notwithstanding the usual accounts, we
find that they did not.  Japan was not a bank-centered economy; instead, firms relied
overwhelmingly on equity finance.  It was not an economy where firms with access to bank credit
outperformed their rivals; instead, firms earned no advantage from such access.  And it was not a
world where the zaibatsu manipulated their banks to favor affiliated firms; instead, zaibatsu banks
loaned affiliated firms little more (if any) than the deposits those firms had made with the banks.
During the first half of the last century, Japanese firms obtained almost all their funds through
decentralized, competitive capital markets.
* Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo, and Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies,
Harvard University (on leave, University of Tokyo).  We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and
suggestions of Robert Mnookin, Christine Jolls, and participants at a Harvard Law School workshop and the
generous financial assistance of the John M. Olin Program in Law, Economics & Business, Harvard Law School, the
University of Tokyo visiting professor program, and the Sloan Foundation.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 2
Do firms need banks, or can they make do with stock markets?  Do firms need stock
markets, or can they make do with banks?  Alexander Gerschenkron long ago argued that
economically “backward” countries could not trust decentralized capital markets to provide their
largest firms sufficient funds.
1  Instead, they needed banks.  More recently, finance theorists have
reasoned from agency theory and the economics of information to much the same result.  And
the transition in eastern Europe has given the issue a programmatic touch:  what should scholars
tell the new finance ministers to do about banks and stock markets?
In this debate over the tie between corporate finance and economic growth, Germany and
Japan have long played a major symbolic role.  Together, they stand as the key examples of
once-backward countries that grew with spectacular speed through bank-centered finance.
Whether the tale fits Germany is not for us to say.  Whether it fits Japan is, and -- alas for
Gerschenkron and modern theorists -- it misses Japan by a mile. Japan did not grow through
bank finance, access to bank credit did not give Japanese firms a competitive advantage, and the
zaibatsu corporate groups did not use their affiliated banks to favor their manufacturing firms.
Japanese firms grew instead by raising money on decentralized, competitive capital markets.
We begin by summarizing the debate over the relation between corporate finance and
economic growth, and the symbolic role that Japan has played in this debate (Section I).  We
demonstrate how banks played almost no role in early 20th-century Japanese corporate finance
(II), and how firms enjoyed no competitive advantage through any access to bank debt (III.A.,
B.).  We conclude by showing that the zaibatsu corporate groups did not use their affiliated
banks to favor their manufacturing firms (III.C.).
I.  The Problem of Banks:
A.  Banks and Economic Growth:
1.  Gerschenkron. -- Some four decades ago, Gerschenkron -- then an economic historian
at Harvard -- published what would quickly become a classic on the mechanisms of growth
among “backward” countries.
2  By his account, those countries that industrialized first (like the
U.S. and the U.K.) could look to market competition and stock exchanges for finance and
entrepreneurship.  Those that were more “backward” (like Germany and Russia) needed a
different route.  Rather than rely on decentralized market processes, they needed the visible
hands of big banks and government.
Primarily, Gerschenkron illustrated his argument with two countries.  To show the role of
banks, he turned to Germany.  The rapid growth there, he argued, depended on strong, large
banks.  “The industrialization of England had proceeded without any substantial utilization of
banking for long-term investment purposes,” explained Gerschenkron.  By contrast, in “a
backward country” like Germany, the “investment banks must be conceived as specific
instruments of industrialization.”
3
                    
1 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective ch. 1 (Cambridge:  Harvard
University Press, 1962).
2 Gerschenkron, supra note, at ch. 1.  Gerschenkron did not invent the U.K.-Germany contrast, of course.
For an early discussion of the contrast in the Japanese literature, see Kamekichi Takahashi, Nippon kin’yu ron
[Japanese Financial Theory] ch. 10 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1931).
3 Gerschenkron, supra note, at 14.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3
To show the role of government, Gerschenkron turned to Russia.  The rapid growth there,
he explained, relied heavily on the visible hand of the czar.  The difference with Germany
stemmed from the degree of under-development.  Russia was so “hopelessly backward” that
even banks could not foster growth.  Instead, the “[s]upply of capital for the needs of
industrialization required the compulsory machinery of the government.”
4
2.  Gerschenkron and Japan. -- (a) Gerschenkron applied. Gerschenkron’s fans did not let
the theory stop at Germany and Russia.  Almost immediately, they applied it to Japan.  As Kozo
Yamamura noted skeptically in 1972, Gerschenkron’s account of Germany seemed to fit the
stereotypical histories of Japan to a tee.  Japan, by these accounts, was a world where “the
modern banking system, strongly encouraged by the government, was extremely important in
providing the necessary industrial capital and, often, entrepreneurial guidance to rapidly growing
industrial firms ....”  Japan, by these accounts, offered a tale begging for the Gerschenkronian
formula.
5
William Lockwood’s economic history of pre-war Japan typifies the stereotypical
accounts.  Pre-war Japan, to Lockwood, had been a place where the “[b]ig banks and trust
companies were securely locked into” the zaibatsu conglomerates.  Those “banking connections
were especially important in a country where a wide public securities market was lacking,” he
reasoned.  And these “financial institutions of Japan, concentrated as they were in the hands of
the government and big business, were the major source of capital for modern industry ....”
6
Given the congruence between stereotype and theory, for many U.S. scholars
Gerschenkron explained Japan’s economic growth straightforwardly:  Japan grew because the
government guided the economy and the big banks dominated industrial finance.  The
government did seem to have intervened aggressively, and did claim to have intervened to
promote growth.  The large banks did seem to have controlled corporate finance, and did seem to
have funded firms in the modern sectors.  Perhaps, reasoned observers, Japan grew fast precisely
because it avoided decentralized market processes.
(b) The role of government.  Within economically inclined circles only half of
Gerschenkron’s hypothesis survives, of course.  Today, any notion that Russia owed its
industrialization to government intervention seems anachronistic in the extreme.  As dead as the
idea may be within economics, however, in other disciplines the notion that governments can
mastermind growth still thrives.
Political scientist Chalmers Johnson may be the best-known of the Japanese-bureaucrats-
grew-the-economy stalwarts.
7  Yet others continue his refrain.  Historian Bruce Cummings
claims that “[i]n the 1930s .... the forerunners of [the modern Ministry of International Trade &
                    
4 Gerschenkron, supra note, at 17, 20.
5 Kozo Yamamura, Japan 1868-1930:  A Revised View, in Rondo Cameron, ed., Banking and Economic
Development:  Some Lessons of History 168 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1972).  Perhaps the most
involved attempt to test Gerschenkron’s applicability to Japan was Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan,
1868-1940 ch. 4 (New York:  The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).
6 William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan:  Growth and Structural Change, 1868-
1938 222(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1954).
7 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle:  The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 305
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1982).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4
Industry] provided the goals, and the banks and corporations the means, for directing and riding
the product cycle (sic).”
8  And Wayne Nafziger more recently argued that “Japan followed the
German pattern of state leadership in developing national productivity, close cooperation
between the state and big business, [and] intimate relationships between large-scale banking and
industry ....”
9
(c) The role of banks.  Even among many economically sophisticated scholars who
(rightly) jettison the government’s role, the banking half of Gerschenkron lives on.  They may or
may not recognize his name, but through agency theory they reach much the same conclusion.
Potentially, moral hazard, adverse selection, and other consequences of asymmetric information
wreak havoc in credit markets.  Potentially, these problems become most severe when markets
are new.  And potentially, financial intermediaries could improve the allocation of credit by
monitoring and screening activities that mitigate the informational asymmetries.  As economic
historian Elisabeth Paulet put it in her history of 19th century French banking:
10
[the modern] notion of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring (or
delegated control) is closely related to Gerschenkron’s account of bank
involvement in firms at the early stage of industrial development.
Just as agency theory formalizes Gerschenkron’s reliance on intermediaries, the modern
dichotomy between the “market-dominated” U.K. and U.S. and the “bank-dominated” Germany
and Japan echoes the Gerschenkronian contrast.
11  Even the usually skeptical Merton Miller
divides corporate governance regimes into “the Japanese/German bank-driven model and the
U.S./British stockholder-driven model.”
12  Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black contrast Japan and
Germany with their “bank-centered capital markets” against the U.S. with its “well-developed
stock market.”
13  Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales compare the “arms’-length” finance of
                    
8 Bruce Cummings, The Origins and Development of Northeast Asian Political Economy:  Industrial
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New
Asian Industrialism 44, 58 (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1987).
9 E. Wayne Nafziger, Learning from the Japanese:  Japan’s Pre-War Development and the Third World 87
(Armonk:  M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
10 Elisabeth Paulet, The Role of Banks in Monitoring Firms:  The Case of the Credit Mobilier 20 (London:
Routledge, 1999).
11 See also, e.g., Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives,
eds., Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation 81, 81 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1993);
Jonathan Barron Baskin & Paul J. Miranti, Jr., A History of Corporate Finance 322, 326 (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Charles W. Calomiris, The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking:  American Finance in the
German Mirror, 1870-1914, in Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Daniel M.G. Raff, eds., Coordination and Information:
Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise 257, 258-59 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press,
1995); Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, Bank Monitoring and Investment:  Evidence from the
Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships, in R. Glenn Hubbard, ed., Asymmetric
Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment 106 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1990); Colin Mayer,
New Issues in Corporate Finance, 32 European Economic Review 1167 (1988); Richard Sylla & George David
Smith, Information and Capital Market Regulation in Anglo-American Finance, in Michael D. Bordo & Richard
Sylla, eds., Anglo-American Financial Systems:  Institutions and Markets in the Twentieth Century 179, 182 (Burr
Ridge, IL:  Irwin, 1995).
12 Merton H. Miller, Merton Miller on Derivatives 135 (New York:  John Wiley & Sons, 1997).
13 Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, xx Journal
of Applied Corporate Finance 36 (1999).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5
“market-based economies like the U.S. and U.K.” with the “relationship-based” finance of “the
main banks of Japanese keiretsus.”  In an almost perfect reprise for Gerschenkron, they then
assert that “the relationship-based system ... works better than an arms’-length system in
relatively less developed economies ....”
14
Non-economists, in turn, repeat the refrains of Lockwood and Cummings.  “From the
beginnings of industrialisation in the Meiji period,” explains William Tsutsui, “corporate finance
in Japan has been predominantly ‘indirect.’ ...  [F]irms have tended to raise investment funds
from financial intermediaries (especially banks) rather than by obtaining the required capital
‘directly’ through the sale of equities to individual savers.”
15  Claims sociologist Michael
Gerlach, these banks “provided, through loans, over half of Japanese companies’ total external
capital” during the pre-war period.
16  And business scholar Carl Kester flatly declares that “[l]ate
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan had essentially no securities market ....”
17
3.  Normative implications. -- Making a virtue of Gerschenkron’s empirics, scholars of
“transitional economies” now give the putative dichotomy between the Anglo-U.S. and German-
Japanese systems a normative cast.  Take Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer:
18
[W]e are skeptical that the option of the “real thing,” Western-style
capitalism is available to some of the East European countries, China, or
Vietnam, however much some people in these countries may crave it.  The
institutions of Western capitalism ... evolved over a long period.  Some of them
are not easily replicable.  In fact the bank-centric organization ... is a way of
mitigating an historical handicap in capital market institutions.  It is important to
realize that it was the underdevelopment of capital markets in late 19th-century
Germany that gave rise to its present system of heavy bank involvement in
financing and management of industrial companies.  Even in the case of Japan, ...
the main bank system orginated in the highly imperfect financial markets and
economic uncertainties of the immediate postwar period.
Others make similar appeals.  In a recent World Bank study, for example, Masahiko Aoki
and Hyung-Ki Kim argue that the transitional economies will not be able to rely on capital
markets for privatizing state-owned firms.
19  In the same volume, Erik Bergloef writes that such
                    
14 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitism?  Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, 11(3)
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 40, 41-42, 44 (1998).
15 William M. Tsutsui, Banking Policy in Japan:  American Efforts at Reform During the Occupation 4
(London:  Routledge, 1988).
16 Michael L. Gerlach, Alliance Capitalism:  The Social Organization of Japanese Business 116 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992).
17 W. Carl Kester, Japanese Takeovers:  The Global Contest for Corporate Control 37 (Boston:  Harvard
Business School Press 1991).
18 Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, Market Socialism:  A Case for Rejuvenation, 6(3) Journal of
Economic Perspectives 101, 103 (1992).
19 Masahiko Aoki & Hung-Ki Kim, Overview, in Masahiko Aoki & Hung-Ki Kim, eds., Corporate
Governance in Transitional Economies:  Insider Control and the Role of Banks xiii (1995).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6
economies will instead need to rely on banks, mutual funds, and concentrated debt and equity:
“[s]tock and bond markets are not going to play a major role ....”
20
B.  The Zaibatsu and Banks:
If economists and legal scholars routinely repeat the dichotomy between the German-
Japanese bank-centered and U.S.-U.K. stock-market-centered traditions, those in Japanese
studies go farther still.  Typically, they claim that the zaibatsu families manipulated the capital
market through their affiliated banks; routed loans on favorable terms to their industrial firms;
and through this scheme gained a stranglehold over the Japanese economy.
1.  Zaibatsu funding. -- On the use of house banks to fund internal zaibatsu production,
historian and one-time ambassador Edwin Reischauer is typical.  Each of the zaibatsu, he
explains, was “centered around its own bank, which financed the other component parts.”
21
Gerlach similarly asserts that each zaibatsu “started its own bank for the purpose of funding the
activities of its group companies.”  By the 1930s, he concludes, “banks increasingly replaced the
[top-tier parent company] and the zaibatsu families as the main sources of working capital for the
group companies.”
22  Lockwood argues that the “financial institutions of Japan, concentrated as
they were in the hands of the government and big business, were the major source of capital for
modern industry ....”
23  Business scholar Rodney Clark explains that “[e]ach zaibatsu had a bank,
which acted as a money pump.  Deposits from the public were channelled toward the other
member companies of the group.”
24  And economists Richard Caves and Masu Uekusa
forthrightly declare that for the zaibatsu the “banks and financial intermediaries were principal
suppliers of capital to the operating companies.”
25
According to many scholars, the zaibatsu used these internal financing patterns to extend
their power.  Lockwood, again, describes zaibatsu credit as a “[m]ost important ... instrument of
expansion.”  Zaibatsu banks “held the deposits of affiliated companies ... and were at the same
time their chief source of capital.  They were also powerful instruments for extending control
over competitors, customers, and suppliers.”
26  During the prewar period, writes economist
Takafusa Nakamura, the zaibatsu banks “used their clout to pull selected firms into their
respective orbits.”
27  And in her recent economic history of Japan, Penelope Francks explains:
28
                    
20 Erik Bergloef, 1995.  Corporate Governance in Transition Economies:  The Theory and Its Policy
Implications, in Masahiko Aoki & Hung-Ki Kim, eds., Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies:  Insider
Control and the Role of Banks 81-82 (1995).
21 Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese 181 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1978).
22 Gerlach, supra note, at 115.
23 Lockwood, supra note, at 222.
24 Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company 42 (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1979).
25 Richard E. Caves & Masu Uekusa, Industrial Organization in Japan 60 (Washington, D.C.:  The
Brookings Institution, 1976).
26 Lockwood, supra note, at 222.
27 Takafusa Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan 205 (New Haven:  Yale University Press, tr.
Robert A. Feldman, 1983); see also id., at 208 (increasing concentration in the banking industry allowed “idle funds
of large firms to be used for extension of zaibatsu power”); W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan:  Political,
Economic and Social Change since 1850 117 (New York:  St. Martin’s, 2d ed., 1995) (“banking was a crucial factor
in the growth of all four of these [zaibatsu] concerns.  It not only gave them access to scarce capital in theirMiwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7
Companies within each zaibatsu group depended on finance from the group’s
bank ....  [C]ontrol over sources of finance was in many ways the key to zaibatsu
organisation and to the ability of group companies to expand in capital-intensive
areas.  The growth of share-ownership among the wider public was very limited
and the role of the stock exchange as a source of business capital has remained
relatively small until quite recent times. ...  [As a result, the] system made it
extremely difficult for businesses outside zaibatsu control to obtain investment
funds on anything like the same terms as those within and inhibited the spread of
capital ownership outside the groups.
2.  The tie to SCAP policy. -- Dispassionate scholars did not invent these tales.  Instead,
they borrowed them from the men and women in the occupation (known as office of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) assigned to destroy the zaibatsu families.
Among the academics, the key figure was Corwin Edwards, Northwestern professor and former
National Recovery Administration official.  As head of the “Mission on Japanese Combines,”
Edwards wrote the report that would justify confiscating zaibatsu wealth.
29
The outcome of Edwards’ mission was never at issue.  As the report itself forthrightly
began, the mission’s “assignment was to recommend ... the basic objective of destroying the
power of the great Japanese combines and managerial families which are collectively known as
the zaibatsu.”  These families, Edwards asserted, had created an economy that “tends to hold
down wages, to block the development of labor unions, to destory the basis for democratic
independence in politics ....”  Hence, they were “to be regarded as among the groups principally
responsible for the war.”
30
For an essay by an economist, the report is remarkably devoid of economic logic; for a
mission charged with collecting data, it is equally devoid of any new information.  But if neither
theoretically coherent nor empirically serious, it nonetheless established what would become the
orthodoxy for decades:
31
[B]ank credit has been the principal source of capital for Japanese industry.  The
older zaibatsu -- the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda -- have relied
heavily for their growth upon their affiliated banks and insurance companies.
Himself a SCAP veteran, T.A. Bisson repeated many of Edwards’ claims in his 1954
classic Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan.  “In Japan, under the old regime,” wrote Bisson,
“privileged groups had exercised despotic power in every phase of economic life.  Whether one
looked at agriculture, labor, industry, banking, or trade, the picture was the same.”  Given this
semi-feudal history, “Japan has had almost no laissez-faire experience or tradition ...” And
through their control over the banks, the zaibatsu families had controlled firms everywhere:
32
                                                                 
formative years, but also enabled them to exercise influence, if not control, over a spread of companies stretching
beyond their groups”).
28 Penelope Francks, Japanese Economic Development:  Theory and Practice 250-51 (London:  Routledge,
2d ed., 1999).
29 [Corwin D. Edwards], Report of the Mission on Japanese Combines, Part I (Department of State Pub.
2628, Far Eastern Series 14, March 1946).
30 Edwards, supra note, at iii (ital. added), vii.
31 Edwards, supra note, at 36.
32 T.A. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan 3, 6, 15 (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1954).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8
The significance of Zaibatsu dominance in commercial lending activity is
underscored by the relative unimportance of private saving and security purchase
by individuals in Japan, making government or private bank loans the only major
source of capital funds available to the Japanese businessman.
Ever the polemicist, Bisson concluded:
33
[A]t the center of each of the economic empires controlled by Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, and Yasuda ... is a great bank with deposits running into billions of
yen.  From these four banks, with their associated or subsidiary trust, insurance
and holding companies, radiates the corporate network which owns the factories,
the mines, the shipping firms, and the commercial enterprises of Japan.  Eight
Zaibatsu concerns, together with the Emperor ... and some 3,500 big landlords,
have held the country and its people as their economic fief.
Eleanor Hadley had worked in the occupation too.  As she saw it:
34
Where a combine possessed financial institutions, financing (pre-1945 style) was
done mainly on an intracombine basis, which gave the top-holding company
further checks on company activity.  By reviewing both short-term and long-term
applications for credit, the combine bank and its affiliated financial institutions
could also check on subsidiary activities. ...  The conditions under which credit
was offered applicant subsidiaries provided an additional opportunity to supervise
their operations.
Citing unspecified “private information” about the Mitsui, she further explained:
35
Although [Mitsui] Banking certainly did not confine extension of credit to the
combine alone, combine interests naturally came first.  More than this, Banking
gave combine firms preferential interest terms and was slow to extend credit to
outsiders who challenged or might challenge an important subsidiary in a
particular field.
Whether one reads scholars today or occupation officials of 50 years back, the message is
clear:  pre-war firms relied crucially on bank loans; the zaibatsu controlled the key, large banks;
they used those banks to funnel money to their favored firms; and through those preferential
credit policies, they extended their grasp over the pre-war Japanese economy.  Unfortunately,
none of this is true.
II.  Bank Debt and Equity Finance in Pre-War Japan:
A.  Large Firm Finance:
1.  Introduction. -- For all the talk of Japan as a bank-centered economy, large Japanese
firms (and Gerschenkron’s theory, after all, is a theory of large firm finance) in the first half of
the century did not rely on banks.  Instead, for the bulk of their funds they sold stock.
Secondarily, they sold bonds and retained their earnings.  Whatever the angle from which one
examines the question, the answer is the same:  banks played only a minor role in financing
substantial pre-war Japanese firms.
                    
33 T.A. Bisson, Japan’s War Economy (New York:  Institute of Pacific Relations vii (1945).
34 Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan 29, 157(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1970).
35 Hadley, supra note, at 163, quoting Eleanor Martha Hadley, Concentrated Business Power in Japan 272
(Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1949).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9
In the discussion below, we realize that readers will understandably worry about sample
bias.  To address the issue, we explore the question from several distinct perspectives:  we
examine large firm balance sheets across several industries (Section A.2., below); flow-of-funds
data for large firms in several industries (A.3.); the size of the stock markets (A.4.); and finance
data for all firms (whether large or small) in the textile industry (B.1.), the railroad industry
(B.2.), and the electric utility industry (B.3.).
2.  Cross-sectional analysis. -- (a) The Imuta data.  Begin with the obvious test:  where
did firms obtain their funds?  Overwhelmingly, they relied on stock issues.  Take Toshimitsu
Imuta’s study of 44 firms in 6 industries.
36  Imuta first identified those 187 firms that published
their balance sheets in the Osaka Asahi newspaper between January and June 1898 (given the
obvious sample bias, we present alternative data as well).  He then excluded textile (51 firms),
railroad (27 firms) and trade firms (21 firms), and of the remaining 88 firms chose 44 that were
in industries with data on multiple firms.  Independently of Imuta, we report data on textile and
railroad firms below.
Table 1A summarizes Imuta’s results:  at the turn of the century, banks seldom mattered.
According to the table, the firms raised 53 to 73 percent of their funds through stock issues, and
another 5 to 18 percent through retained earnings.  They raised 0 to 11 percent through bond
issues, and only 1 to 13 percent from banks.  As we note below (Tables 4-6), cotton textile firms
in 1898 raised 58 percent of their funds through stock issues, 10 percent through retained
earnings, 5 percent through bond issues, and 11 percent through bank loans; railroad companies
in 1898 raised 91 percent through stocks, 2 percent through retained earnings, 6 percent through
bonds, and 1 percent through bank loans.
(b) Our own data.  Both to avoid the potential bias introduced by Imuta’s decision to
examine firms advertising their financials, and to see whether this reliance on equity continued
into the 20
th century -- for both those reasons, we independently collected balance sheet data on
the largest Japanese firms in the 1920s and 1930s.  We began by replicating Shoichi Asajima’s
study of corporate flow of funds (reported at Sec. A.3., below).
37  Asajima took four periods
(1911-1919, 1919-1926, 1926-1931, and 1931-36), and collected information on how large firms
funded their projects from accounting data in the Kabushiki nenkan [Stock Annual].
38  H e
defined “large” as all firms appearing in the nenkan with capital of at least 1 million yen in 1911,
5 million yen in 1919, or 10 million yen in 1926, 1931, or 1936.
We assembled data on five of Asajima’s industries (unfortunately, these do not track
Imuta’s industry categories):  textiles, mining, food and paper, chemicals, steel machinery, and
sugar.  Like Asajima, we used 1919, 1926, 1931, and 1936.  We then added those firms in 1941
with capital of 20 million yen or more.
                    
36 Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha bunseki josetsu [Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era
Corporations] (Tokyo:  Hosei University Press, 1976).
37 Shoichi Asajima, Daikigyo no shikin chotatsu [Capital Raising Among Large Firms], in Tsunehiko Yui
& Eisuke Daito, eds., Nihon keiei shi 3:  Dai kigyo jidai no torai [History of Japanaese Management, 3:  The Advent
of the Age of the Large Firm] 219-69 (Tokyo:  Iwanami shoten, 1995).
38 Osakaya shoten, Kabushiki nenkan [Stock Annual] (Osaka: Osakaya shoten, various years).  Although
published by a rival company, this is a very similar volume to the source used in Jennifer L. Frankl, An Analysis of
Japanese Corporate Structure, 1915-1937, 59 Journal of Economic History 997 (1999), discussed below at Sec. III.C.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 10
In Table 1B, we report the mean ratio of bank debt to gross assets for these firms,
catalogued by industry and by date.
39  For most industries and years, the ratio ranges from 2 to 8
percent.  Of the 25 cells in Table 1B, in only 6 is it over 10 percent, and in none is it over 20
percent.  We follow that ratio with the ratio of bank debt to total capital (legal capital plus
reserves, carryforwards, and current profits).
40  The number is larger, given that gross assets
usually exceed total capital.  Other than the few cells where firms with large losses had very
small capital values, the ratios remain small.
In related research, we compare the equity/gross-assets and fixed-assets/gross-assets
ratios for firms in heavy industry listed in the annual publication of the Mitsubishi Economic
Research Center.  Consistently, we find that the average equity ratio exceeded the fixed-assets
ratio -- whether the 206 firms in 1928, the 205 in 1930, the 187 in 1933, the 195 in 1937, the 199
in 1940, or the 209 in 1943.  At least on average, the firms did not need debt to finance long-term
investment.  Instead, they used what bank debt they had for operating expenses.
41
(c) Funds availability.  If firms did not borrow much, it was not because banks would not
lend.  Bankers searched hard for firms willing to borrow, and bank histories recall the frustration
they felt.
42  Whether at the large banks or the small, bankers had funds for which they could not
find appropriate borrowers.  Among the five to six biggest banks, the loan to deposit ratio (from
1925 to 1940) fluctuated between 50 and 80 percent.  Among the other banks, it fell almost
monotonically from 100 percent in 1925 to under 40 percent in 1940. Among all banks, it
hovered at 40-55 percent:  1912-14 -- 55 percent; 1915-18 -- 47; 1919-22 -- 51; 1223-26 -- 55;
1927-30 -- 48; 1931-34 -- 52; 1935-38 -- 45
43
Not only did banks not lend heavily to firms, they did not invest heavily in stock either.
Kaichi Shimura studied the identity of the invetors holding at least 1000 shares of stock in the
511 firms listed in a 1919 national investor registry.  Through this, he created a data base of
8,506 investors in 379 companies -- firms responsible for 62 percent of the legal capital of all
extant corportaions, and virtually all listed companies.  Among these investors, he found that
                    
39 We translate “shakunyukin” as “bank debt,” and “so shisan” as “gross assets.”  The categories are
imprecise:  some shakunyukin could be from sources other than banks, and bank debt could appear in such other
categories as “tegata kariire.”  Tokyo shibaura denki, Tokyo shibaura denki 85 nen shi [An 85-Year History of
Toshiba] 185 (Kawasaki:  Toshiba, 1963).
40 Given the practice in some Japanese firms of issuing stock at less than par but subject to call, we would
have liked to be able to calculate paid-in capital as well.  Unfortunately, reliable figures for paid-in capital are hard
to derive from the Kabushiki nenkan.  In any event, given that a firm could not issue additional shares without first
obtaining full par value from existing shareholders, and given that shareholders would be liable for the full amount
of par in case of insolvency, legal capital is in some ways a more relevant figure anyway.
41 Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Seisaku kin’yu to keizai hatten:  Senzenki Nihon kogyo ginko no
keesu [Policy Finance and Economic Growth:  The Case of the Pre-War Industrial Bank of Japan] tab. 7, 66
Keizaigaku ronshu [Economic Review of the University of Tokyo] __ (forthcoming 2000) (University of Tokyo
Facultyof Economics Discussion Paper CIRJE-J-26); Mitsubishi keizai kenkyu jo, Honpo jigyo seisaku bunseki
[Analysis of Japanese Firm Performance] (Tokyo:  various years).  See also Tokyo shibaura, supra note, at 185.
42 Mitsui ginko, Mitsui ginko 80 nen shi [An 80-Year History of the Mitsui Bank] 381 (Tokyo:  K.K.
Mitsui ginko, 1957); Yoshio Asai, 1920 nendai ni okeru Mitsui ginko to Mitsui zaibatsu [The Mitsui Bank and the
Mitsui Zaibatsu in the 1920s], 11 Mitsui bunko ronso 251, 257 (1977).
43 Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note, at tab. 1; Juro Teranishi, Nihon no keizai hatten to kin’yu [Japanese
Economic Development and Finance] 337 (Tokyo:  Iwanami shoten, 1982); Haruhito Takeda, Teikoku shugi to
minpon shugi [Imperialism and Democracy] (Tokyo:  Shuei sha, 1992).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11
banks held only 3.2 percent of the stock at issue.  By constrast, individuals held 76.2 percent of
the stock, and non-bank corporations held the rest.  Zaibatsu families held only 2 percent of the
stock.  Of all firms nationally, from 1930 to 1940 banks held only only 3.2-4.6 percent of the
stock, and the large city banks (primarily zaibatsu banks) held only 1.3 - 2.4 percent of the
stock.
44
Fundamentally, pre-war Japanese banks were not institutions that made large, long-term
investments in firms.  Instead, they saw themselves as commercial banks that specialized in
assorted payments functions and short-term loans.  As the war intensified, the government
increasingly pushed them to provide funds long-term to munitions firms, but this was not a
change they voluntarily accepted.  It was a change the government required.  When Sumitomo
CEO Masatsune Ogura became Minister of Finance in 1941, he promptly assembled the leading
financeers to discuss the new corporate finance program.  As he outlined it, the government
would require banks to engage in “enterprise finance”:  to supply funds long-term for expansions
in productive capacity.  Japanese banks, he noted, “have generally maintained lending practices
directed toward commercial finance.”  No longer would they be free to do so -- “for banks now
to promote enterprises will require a change in the methods they have traditionally used.”
45
3.  Flow of funds. -- If cross-sectional data show no evidence that big firms relied on
bank debt, turn to the flow of funds -- to the question of where large Japanese firms obtained any
increase in funding.  Toward that end, we report Asajima’s investigation of the largest Japanese
firms over four periods (1911-1919, 1919-1926, 1926-1931, and 1931-36).  Using the size cut-
offs described above, he obtained a cohort of 123 firms for 1911-19, 111 for 1919-26, 134 for
1926-31, and 155 for 1931-36.
As Table 2A shows, the big firms seldom borrowed the extra money they needed from
banks.  Instead, they relied on equity.  When these firms needed additional funds, for 35 to 55
percent of the amount they sold stock. For more modest amounts, they accumulated earnings and
sold bonds.  Even during the 1920s Japanese recession (from 1926 to 1931, per capita GNP rose
2.4 percent),
46 they turned to banks for only 14.6 percent of any extra funds they needed.
Predictably, Table 2A masks some sectoral variation.  In some industries during some
periods, firms actually cut their total funding:  ocean shipping during 1919-36, textiles in 1926-
31, and the food and paper industry in 1931-36.  Nonetheless, the picture that emerges across
industries tracks the general message of Table 2A:  in none of the industries did large firms use
bank loans for extra funds.  Table 2B disaggregates the Table 2A sample into 11 industries, and
then divides the net increase in bank debt during each period by the sum of the net increases in
bonds and paid-in capital.  Of the resulting 44 cells, in only 8 is the ratio of the increase in bank
debt to the increase in bonds and stock issues greater than .3; in only 4 is it greater than .4, and in
only 2 is it greater than .5.
                    
44 Kaichi Shimura, Nihon shihon shijo bunseki [An Analysis of Japanese Capital Markets] 386-90 (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1969); Bank of Japan, Honpo keizai tokei [Domestic Economic Statistics] (Tokyo:  Bank
of Japan, 1960).
45 Nihon ginko ed., Nihon kin’yu shi shiryo, showa hen [Materials on Japanese Financial History, Showa
Period] vol. 31, 480 (Tokyo:  Publisher, 1971).  Formally, Ogura had been soriji for the representative directors of
the Sumitomo holding company.
46 Kazushi Ohkawa, Nobukiyo Takamatsu & Yuzo Yamamoto, Choki keizai tokei:  kokumin shotoku
[Long-Term Economic Statistics:  National Income] 237 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shinpo sha, 1974).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12
Table 1:  Cross-sectional Capitalization Measures
A.  Mean Capitalization of Firms, 1897
                    Food     Chem.    Brick    Cement   Metals   Machines
Paid-in Capital 64.6% 71.1% 71.8% 53.1% 72.5% 66.3%
Retained Earnings 15.6  5.3 14.9 18.4  7.3  7.3
Bonds  3.4  0  0 10.3  0  0
Bank Debt  5.2  1.8  9.7  4.5 13.2  2.6
Other Debt 11.3 21.7  3.7 13.8  7.1 23.8
No. of firms 15  7  8  4  5  5
Mean assets
(x 1000 yen) 196.7 206.5 57.9 340.4 253.5 596.3
     Source:  Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha bunseki
josetsu [Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era Corporations]
138 (Tokyo:  Hosei University Press, 1976).
B.  Mean Ratios of Bank Debt to Asset and to Total Capital, 1919-
1941
   1919    1926    1931    1936    1941
               BD/A BD/TC    BD/A BD/TC    BD/A BD/TC    BD/A BD/TC    BD/A BD/TC
Food & paper 6.18 8.51  7.50 12.70 12.63 51.90 4.78  8.23  5.64  8.38
Chemicals 4.75 7.06  4.70  6.97  6.99 16.89 2.12  4.12   14.29 25.22
Steel mach 4.17 8.68 11.98 60.95 12.46 27.40 4.94  7.30   12.98 33.96
Mining 2.17 3.03  4.07  5.12  7.53 11.43   8.27 10.20   14.22 29.78
Sugar 0.19 0.30  1.75  4.93  8.12 27.54 7.98 20.64  1.64  3.73
n:    57     61     52     67    104
Notes:
BD/A:  Bank Debt (shakunyukin)/Assets (so shisan).
BD/TC:  Bank Debt/Total Capital.  For total capital, we sum
legal capital (calculated at par value), reserves, carryforwards, and
current profits.
Source:  Osakaya shoten, Kabushiki nenkan [Stocks Annual] (Tokyo:
various publishers, various years).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13
Table 2:  Flow of Funds Measures
A.  Source of Additional Funds, 1911-1936
                         1911-19      1919-26      1926-31      1931-36
Equity 34.4% 48.8% 39.4% 53.6%
Earnings 33.4  4.8 -2.0 28.6
Bonds Issues  4.5 26.4 44.1  9.1
Bank Loans  4.6  6.4 14.6 -1.7
Trade Credit  6.3 11.4 -3.6 -2.6
Other Loans 16.9  2.2  7.5 13.3
Total Net Increase     2,292      4,394  2,601    2,676
No. of Firms          123        111    134      155
Note:  The first six lines give the percentage of the net increase in
funding over the period accounted for by a given source.  The seventh line
gives the total net increase in funding for the firms, in million yen.  The
last line gives the number of firms.
B.  Ratio of Net Increase in Bank Debt to Net Increase in Bond
and Stock Issues, 1911-1936
                         1911-19      1919-26      1926-31      1931-36
Textiles  .046 .042 -.269  .277
Railroads  .046 .070  .321 -.112
Electrical Utilities  .106 .084  .104 -.273
Chemicals  .105 .043  .155  .016
Brick  .018 .097 -.061  .216
Mining  .085 .053  .294  .262
Paper & Food  .399 .059  .163 -.040
Ocean Shipping -.066 .382 -.257 -.113
Steel Machinery  .355 .056  .437 -.010
Sugar -.043 .111  .834 2.646
Others  .402 .056  .136  .279
All Industries  .118 .085 .175 -.027
     Notes:  In each case, we give (i) the percentage of the net increase in
funding at the firms in an industry represented by the net increase in bank
debt, divided by (ii) the percentage of that net increase represented by the
net increase in bond issues plus paid-in capital.
Source:  Calculated from data found in Shoichi Asajima, “Daikigyo no
shikin chotatsu [Capital Raising Among Large Firms,” in Tsunehiko Yui & Eisuke
Daito, eds., Nihon keiei shi 3:  Dai kigyo jidai no torai [History of Japanaese
Management, 3:  The Advent of the Age of the Large Firm] 235-38 (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 1995).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14
4.  Exchanges. -- Consistent with the way firms relied on stock, the turn-of-the-century
Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges thrived.  Founded in 1878, by 1900 the TSE listed the bonds
of 7 firms and the shares of 113.  Ten years later it listed 43 bonds and 142 stocks.  By 1920,
those numbers had climbed to 157 bonds and 569 stocks, and by 1925 to 492 bonds and 665
stocks.  Similarly founded in 1878, by 1900 the OSE listed the bonds of 1 firm and the shares of
50.  Ten years later, it listed no private sector bonds but the shares of 64 firms.  By 1920, those
numbers had climbed to 8 bonds and 206 stocks, and by 1925 to an unspecified number of bonds
and the shares of 191 firms.
47  For comparison, we include modern listing figures in Table 3.
These shareholders traded actively.  During 1890, investors on the TSE contracted to sell
1.6 million shares.  During 1900, they contracted for 3.7 million shares, in 1910 11.0 million, in
1920 37.5 million, and in 1925 59.8 million.  On the OSE during 1890 investors contracted to
sell 982,000 shares.  During 1900, they contracted for 5.2 million shares, in 1910 11.2 million, in
1920 22.3 million, and in 1925 13.0 million
48.
Less so than their contemporaries at the NYSE to be sure, investors on the TSE and OSE
were still impressively active.
49  Collectively, they traded stocks valued at 512 million yen in
1900, 2.09 billion in 1910, 8.13 billion in 1920, and 4.13 billion in 1925.  Calculated as a
percentage of GDP, these figures amounted to 21.2 percent, 53.3 percent, 51.1 percent, and 25.4
percent, respectively.  As Table 3 shows, these numbers easily place them within the range of
modern advanced economies.
                    
47 Tokyo kabushiki torihiki jo, Tokyo kabushiki torihiki jo 50 nen shi [Fifty Year History of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange] tab. 1 (Tokyo:  Tokyo kabushiki torihiki jo, 1928); Osaka kabushiki torihiki jo, Daikabu 50 nen shi
[50 Year History of the Osaka Stock Exchange] supp. 35 - 186 (Osaka:  Osaka kabushiki torihiki jo, 1928).  These
numbers  modestly overstate the number of firms listed on the exchange, since they count as separate entries the
different classes of stock of those firms trading more than one class.
48 Tokyo, supra note, at tab. 3; Osaka, supra note, at tab. 1.
49 On the New York Stock Exchange, investors traded 139 million shares in 1900, 164 million in 1910, 227
million in 1920, and 454 million in 1925.  See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
(Washington, D.C.:  Bureau of the Census, various years).  The OSE data record the number of shares traded, but
not their monetary value.  Accordingly, we estimate that value based on the value of the shares traded on the TSE in
that year.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15
Table 3:  Modern Stock Exchanges in Selected Countries --
Listings and Turnover-Value/GDP
                  No. of 1999           Turnover/GDP (%)
                  Listed Firms     1990       1999
U.S. 8450 31.5 159.8
U.K. 2399 28.6  86.0
Germany  741 22.1  65.2
Japan 2416 54.0  25.1
Canada 1384 12.4  64.1
Australia 1162 13.5 112.6
Korea  725 30.1  43.0
Israel  644 10.5  11.2
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators tab. 5.2
(Washington, D.C.:  World Bank, 2000).
- - - - - - - - - -
B.  Three Case Studies:
1.  Textiles. -- Both to give context to this data and to examine financing patterns at firms
too small to appear in the samples above, we turn to comprehensive data on three important
industries:  cotton textiles, railroads, and electrical utilities.  In the early 1900s, the Japanese
cotton-spinning industry grew spectacularly fast.  From 60 million yen in 1894 (in constant
1934-36 prices), production climbed to 167 million yen in 1904, 447 million in 1914, 657
million in 1924, and 1,104 million in 1934.  By the 1920s the Japanese firms were using more
raw cotton than their British competitors.  Domestically, they dominated the economy.  During
the 1930s, the cotton spinning firms produced a quarter of all domestic manufactured goods and
employed 40 percent of all factory workers.
50
The men who began these firms sold the stock to a broad array of investors.  Although
the investors often came from a few towns or cities (a point that obviously facilitated trust),
rarely did a single shareholder or group of shareholders dominate the firm.  Kazuo Yamaguchi
studied the 60-odd spinning firms operating in 1898.
51  On average, he found that the firms had
331 shareholders.  The largest investor held about 8 percent of the stock, the largest five together
held 24 percent, and the largest 10 held 33 percent.  Only 11 percent of the firms (7 firms) had
fewer than 100 shareholders, while 52 percent (32 firms) had 300 shareholders or more.  In no
                    
50 Shozaburo Fujino, Shiro Fujino & Akira Ono, Choki keizai tokei:  Sen’i kogyo [Long-Term Economic
Statistics:  Textiles] 246 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate
Governance in Transitional Economies:  Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 Journal of
Legal Studies 171, 178 (2000).
51 Kazuo Yamaguchi, Meiji 31 nen zengo boseki gaisha no kabusnushi ni tsuite [Regarding Spinning Firm
Shareholders at Around 1898], 15(2) [Meiji daigaku] Keiei ronshu 1 (1968).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 16
firm did the largest shareholder hold 50 percent or more of the stock, and in only 3 firms did a
single shareholder hold 20 percent of the stock or more.
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the importance of equity issues.  Table 4 gives the mean
capitalization of the 52 spinning firms in 1898 with available data, and confirms the way that
firms of all sizes used equity rather than bank loans.  In general, they raised 58 percent of their
funds through stock issues, another 10 through earnings, and 5 through bonds.  Only 11 percent
of their funds did they borrow from banks.  Although the largest half of the firms raised the least
from the banks (9-10 percent for the 27 firms with 10,000 or more spindles), even the smaller
firms raised less than 20 percent from banks.  Table 5 confirms the way the reliance on dispersed
shareholdings had persisted over time -- even at the very outset of the industry in 1890, the firms
had raised their equity from a mean 121 investors.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 17
Table 4:  Mean Capitalization of Cotton-Spinning Firms, 1898
    Number of Operating Spindles     .
 5,999  6,000- 10,000- 20,000 All
                    or less   9,999     19,999    or more   Firms
Paid-in Capital 186 (64) 338 (59) 451 (59) 827 (55) 469 (58)
Retained Earnings   7  (2)  11  (2)  65  (9) 226 (15)  84 (10)
Bonds   0  (0)  25  (4)  41  (5)  99  (7)  44  (5)
Bank Debt  47 (16)  78 (14)  65  (9) 153 (10)  90 (11)
Other Debt  51 (18) 123 (21) 136 (20) 188 (13) 128 (16)
No. of Firms  12   13  12  15  52
Notes:  The table gives the mean per firm figure, in 1000 yen,
followed by the percentage of total firm capitalization in parenthesis.
Bank debt includes shakunyu kin and toza karikoshi.
Source: Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha bunseki josetsu
[Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era Corporations] (20) (Tokyo:
Hosei University Press, 1976).
Table 5: Shareholders per Firm, by Industry, 1890-1898
                         1890      1892      1894      1896      1898
Cotton-Spinning
Shareholders:  121  172  222  280  457
Paid-in capital:  143  271  379  456
No. of firms   61   53   76   71
Railroads
Shareholders:   939  769  669  695 1040
Paid-in capital:  3253 3711 3034 3383 3665
No. of firms:   12   13   20   26   42
Electrical Utility
Shareholders:  255  161  119  109  107
Paid-in capital:  168  152  120  145  141
No. of firms:    8   11   20   29   45
Notes:  “Shareholders” gives the mean number of shareholders, per
firm.  “Paid-in capital” gives the mean paid-in capital per firm, in
1000 yen.
Sources: Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha bunseki
josetsu [Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era Corporations] (59)
(Tokyo:  Hosei University Press, 1976), as supplemented by Naikaku tokei
kyoku, ed., Nippon teikoku tokei nenkan (Tokyo:  Naikaku tokei kyoku,
various years).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 18
2.  Railroads -- By 1869, U.S. entrepreneurs had taken trains across the north American
continent.  They had also brought tales of these machines to Japan.  Hearing their accounts, the
new government was all too eager to respond.  After some initial missteps it ran tracks from
Tokyo to Yokohama (18 miles).  By 1874 it had finished the line from Osaka to Kobe, and the
Tokyo-Yokohama line carried 1.6 million passengers a year.
52
In 1883, private entrepreneurs began running trains too.  As they did, the focus in the
industry increasingly shifted from the national railway to the private.  In 1890, the national
government owned 550 miles of track, while private firms owned 1,165 miles.  By 1900, the
government owned 1,059 miles and private firms 2,966, and by 1905 the government owned
1531 miles to the private firms’ 3,251.  In 1906, by fiat the government nationalized 2,823 miles
of private track.  By then, the various railroads constituted some 14 percent of all domestic
investment.
53
From the outset, the railroads relied on stock issues.
54  Within a year of starting
operations, the first private railroad listed its stock on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  In 1886
another firm listed its stock, in 1887 two more, in 1888 3 more, and in 1889 another 3.  During
the 1890s, 23 additional railroad firms listed their stock, and through 1905 another 14.  On the
Osaka Stock Exchange, 8 railroads listed their stocks during the 1880s, and another 26 during the
1890s.
55
Even more than the cotton spinning companies, the railroads sold their stock to a broad
array of investors.  As Table 5 shows, during the 1890s the mean number of shareholders per
railroad ranged from 600 to 1,100.  Toshimitsu Imuta studied shareholder lists at three of the
railroads.  At the largest (the Nippon), in 1881 (with 5,597 total shareholders) the lead
shareholder had 9.5 percent of the stock and the largest 5 collectively held 27.5 percent; in 1886
(3,098 shareholders) the lead held 3.7 percent and the largest 5 held 14.3; and in 1898 (4,553
shareholders) the lead held 14.7 percent and the largest 5 held 22.2.
56
                    
52 J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy:  Institutional Choice in Imperial
Japan ch. 9 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1995).
53 Ryoshin Minami, Choki keizai tokei:  Tetsudo to denryoku [Long-Term Economic Statistics:  Railroads
and Electric Utilities] 6 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shinpo sha, 1965).
54 According to historian Steven Ericson, banks played a “vital contribution to the supply of ordinary share
capital” in the railroad industry.  Steven J. Ericson, Railroads in Crisis:  The Financing and Management of Japanese
Railway Companies during the Panic of 1890, in William D. Wray, ed., Managing Industrial Enterprise:  Cases from
Japan’s Prewar Experience 121, 176-77 (Cambridge:  Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1989).  Ultimately,
“the experience of Meiji railroads indicates that Gerschenkron’s thesis concerning the late-comer’s need for ‘special
institutional devices’ to substitute for individual private enterprise still has relevance for the Japanese case.”  Steven
J.Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle:  Railroads and the State in Meiji Japan 382 (Cambridge:  Harvard Council on
East Asian Studies, 1996).  In the end, however, to show the “vital contribution” of banks Ericson does no more than
show that banks lent money on collateral, that they accepted stock as collateral, and that among the blue-chip stocks
used as collateral for loans to individuals, railroad shares figured prominently.  Even by Ericson’s own account, in
other words, all banks did to promote railroads was to lend money to rich investors who owned, inter alia, railroad
stock.
55 Tokyo, supra note; Imuta, supra note, at (18).
56 Imuta, supra note, at (64)-(87).  Where necessary, we have estimated the total number of shares
outstanding using data from Tokyo, supra note; and Tetsudo kyoku, Meiji 32 nendo Tetsudo kyoku nempo [1899
Railway Bureau Annual Report] (Tokyo:  Tetsudo kyoku, 1900).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 19
At the Hokkaido takushoku railroad, in 1889 (with 946 shareholders) the lead shareholder
(the Imperial Household Agency) held 7.7 percent, while the largest 5 held 15.4; in 1894 (694
shareholders) the Agency was still the lead shareholder with 7.7 percent, and the largest 5 held
26.9.  By 1902 (1,145 shareholders), the Mitsui group held larger interests (perhaps because it
found the railroad a convenient complement to its other Hokkaido investments, particularly in
coal mining), and the Agency’s interest had fallen to third.  At the Kansai railroad, in 1888 the
lead shareholder held 3.3 percent and the largest 5 held 8.4; in 1895 (1,456 shareholders) the lead
held 9.0 and the largest five held 19.3; in 1906 the lead held 2.5 and the largest five held 7.6.
From these stockholders, the railroads raised virtually all their funds (Table 6).  What else
they needed they obtained by selling bonds.  From banks, they raised only 0-3 percent.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 20
Table 6: Capitalization of Railroad Firms, 1884-1898
                 1884      1886        1888        1890      1892      1894     1896      1898  .
Paid-in Cap. 5163(100) 8062(100) 14997(97) 38493(95) 46737(94) 59177(88) 89011(91) 169999(92)
Ret. Earnings    0  (0)    0  (0)   231 (2)   511 (1)   775 (2)  1322 (2)  1587 (2)   3374 (2)
Bonds    0  (0)    0  (0)     0 (0)   269 (1)  1710 (3)  5778 (9)  5350 (5)  10640 (6)
Bank Debt    0  (0)    0  (0)   165 (1)  1162 (3)   580 (1)   877 (1)  2316 (2)   2190 (1)
No. firms 1 2  6 12 13 20 27   41
Notes:  Current values, in 1000 yen, followed by percentage.
Bank debt excludes short-term.
Source:  Tetsudo kyoku, Meiji 32 nendo Tetsudo kyoku nempo
[1899 Railway Bureau Annual Report] 221-37 (Tokyo:  Tetsudo kyoku,
1900).
- - - - - - - - - -
3.  Electrical utilities. -- Like textiles and railroads, electrical power was a growth
business in pre-war Japan.  The first commercial electrical power plant began operations in Great
Britain in 1882.  The first in Japan began in 1887, and from there the industry boomed.  From 1
percent of gross national investment at the turn of the century, it grew to 9 percent of GNI within
two decades.  From 1910 to 1920, consumption of electrical power in Japan rose from 523
kilowatt-hours to 3,795.  By 1930, it stood at 12,618.
57
Although per capita consumption of electrical power lagged that of the U.S., among
manufacturing firms the pace of electrification tracked the U.S. pace.  From 1910 to 1920, the
percentage (by horsepower) of electrically powered machines in Japan rose from 20 percent to
61, and over the next decade to 81.  In the U.S., the percentage of electrically powered machines
rose from 25.4 percent (1909) to 55.0 (1919) to 82 (1929).
58
During most of this period, the Japanese electrical utility industry remained both
competitive and unregulated.  So competitive was it that of the 39 firms listed in the Kabushiki
nenkan for 1911 and 1918 barely 15 were still in business in 1924.  Only during the 1930s did
the situation change:  in 1932 the firms formed a cartel to stop price competition, and in 1939 the
government began regulating them.
59
                    
57 Minami, supra note, at 6, tab. 14; Takeo Kikkawa, Nihon denryoku gyo no hatten to Matsunaga
Yasuzaemon [Yasuzaemon Matsunaga and the Development of the Japanese Electrical Power Industry] 28 (Nagoya:
Nagoya daigaku shuppan kai, 1995).
58 The figures for Japan include “prime movers” only; the figures for the U.S. include all machinery.  For
Japan, see Minami, supra note, at tab. 27; for the U.S., see U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States tabs. P 68-73, S 32-43 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1975, 1997 CD-ROM version).
59 Kikkawa, supra note, at 8, tabs. 1-11, 1-16; Minami, supra note, at 4.  The initial regulatory statute dated
from 1931.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 21
Like the spinning and railway firms, the electrical utilities relied on stock and bond issues
for their funds.  As the cross-sectional figures in Table 7-A show, from 1910 to 1935 the fraction
of funds from stocks fell from 83 percent to 57, while the fraction from bonds climbed from 4 to
32.  Bank debt, however, hovered in the 7-13 percent range.  Table 7-B tells a similar story:
when firms needed extra money, they relied heavily on stock and bond issues.  They turned to
banks for less than a fifth of any additional funds.
Electrical utilities issued stock broadly.  To explore shareholdings among the smaller
firms as well as the larger, Takeo Kikkawa catalogued all 53 firms with relevant data for 1903.
Only five of the firms had fewer than 30 shareholders, while 23 had 100 or more.  Of the 130
firms with available data in 1911, only 22 had fewer than 30 shareholders and over half had 100
or more.
60
The larger firms sold stock to a broad swath of investors indeed.  Take the 39 firms in
both the 1911 and 1918 editions of the Kabushiki nenkan (disproportionately the larger firms).
They had a mean 2.9 million yen in legal capital in 1911 and 421 shareholders.  By 1918, they
had 5.2 million in legal capital and 842 shareholders.  Or take the 15 firms in both the 1918 and
1924 editions.  They had 10.8 million yen in legal capital and 1,648 shareholders in 1918, and a
mean 41.5 million in legal capital and 4,552 shareholders in 1924.
61
Broad shareholdings continued until the war.  On average, the 31 firms with shareholding
data in the Kabushiki nenkan for 1930 had about 7,400 shareholders.  No firm had fewer than
400 shareholders, and only 4 had fewer than 1,000.  The lead shareholder held a mean 17 percent
of the stock, and the largest five collectively held 31 percent.  In only 1 firm did the lead
shareholder hold a majority of the stock, and in only 10 did it hold more than 20 percent.  Of the
latter 10 firms, however, six were effectively subsidiaries of other electrical utilities.  If we
exclude those 6, the mean equity interest of the largest shareholder drops to 11.9 percent.
As Table 7 shows, over time the industry shifted from stocks to bonds.  This was
particularly true among the five largest firms.  During 1923-27, these firms raised only 31
percent of their funds from equity, and during 1928-31 only 14.  Through bonds, however, they
raised 49 and 79 percent.  More surprisingly perhaps, they sold many of their bonds abroad
(primarily in the U.S.) -- about 2/3 of the 1923-27 issues, and 2/5 of the 1928-31 issues.
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60 Kikkawa, supra note, at tab. 1-6.
61 Kikkawa, supra note, at tabs. 1-1, 1-11, 1-16.
62 Kikkawa, supra note, at tab. 1-34.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 22
Table 7: Electric Utility Firms, 1910-1938
A. Industry Capitalization
                    1910     1915     1920     1925     1930     1935   .
Paid-in Capital 86 (83) 305 (75) 660 (76) 1635 (61) 2306 (51) 2858 (57)
Retained Earnings  5  (5)  13  (3)  46  (5)   89  (3)  148  (3)  213  (4)
Bonds  4  (4)  45 (11)  75  (9)  661 (25) 1456 (32) 1626 (32)
Bank Debt  9  (8)  43 (11)  89 (10)  286 (11)  571 (13)  351  (7)
Number of firms  178  457  542  532  482  454
B.  Source of Additional Funds per Year.
                    1908-14      1915-18      1919-24     1925-30     1931-38
Paid-in Capital 34 (75) 31 (72) 183 (61) 134 (37) 98 (79)
Retained Earnings  1  (3)  4 (10)   8  (3)  12  (3) 12 (10)
Bonds  4  (9)  5 (10)  82 (28) 153 (43) 22 (18)
Bank Debt  6 (13)  4  (8)  25  (9)  60 (17) -8 (-7)
Notes:  Current values, in million yen, followed by
percentage.
Sources:  Calculated from Takeo Kikkawa, Nihon denryoku gyo
no hatten to Matsunaga Yasuzaemon [Yasuzaemon Matsunaga and the
Development of the Japanese Electrical Power Industry] tabs. 1-1,
1-3 (Nagoya:  Nagoya daigaku shuppan kai, 1995).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 23
III.  Bank Debt, Firm Performance, and Zaibatsu Affiliation:
A.  Introduction:
If some economists sometimes claim that pre-war Japanese firms relied heavily on bank
debt, scholars in Japanese studies routinely add a strategic angle.  Routinely, they draw on pre-
war Japanese journalists and occupation officials to argue that the zaibatsu families used their
control over banks to manipulate capital market imperfections to their private advantage.  Indeed,
SCAP relied on precisely that claim to justify its destruction of the zaibatsu families.
Typically, these scholars proceed in three steps.  First, they argue that some firms had
easier access to credit than others, and that this access gave the firms a competitive advantage in
the product market.  Second, they claim that the large zaibatsu groups had the market power to
manipulate the allocation of credit.  Third, they assert that the zaibatsu used that power in the
credit market to gain control -- through their affiliated manufacturing firms -- over various
product markets.
As oft repeated as the claim may be, for two reasons it is false.  First, the most successful
firms did not rely on bank debt (Section B., below).  Second, the zaibatsu groups did not use
their affiliated banks to route funds to their affiliated manufacturing firms (Section C.).  As
central as the claim was to occupation policy, it was sheer fiction.
B.  Debt and Performance:
1.  Introduction. -- To explore whether firms with favored access to bank debt performed
better than those without, we regress two measures of firm performance on several measures of
firm finance.  On the one hand, if firms faced competitive capital markets, then by standard
theory they would have chosen a capital structure that maximized shareholder returns.  If so, then
the level of bank debt at a firm would bear no systematic relation to firm performance, and our
regressions would yield no statistically significant coefficients.
On the other hand, if the standard accounts were true, then firms with favored access to
bank debt should have enjoyed a competitive advantage.  If so, then firms with higher levels of
bank debt should have outperformed firms with lower.  Our regressions, in turn, should generate
statistically significant positive coefficients on the level of bank debt at a firm.
2.  The data. -- To assemble the necessary data, we first replicate Asajima’s data base
(described above) for six key industries (as defined by the Kabushiki nenkan):  steel machinery,
chemicals, textiles, food & paper, mining, and sugar.  Recall that Asajima collected data for 1919,
1926, 1931, and 1936.  We add 1941, and calculate for each firm the levels of equity (generally,
the sum of legal capital, reserves, carryforwards, and current profits), bonds, bank debt, and
gross assets.
63  In addition, we use Kabushiki nenkan data to estimate stock-market capitalization.
Because the nenkan gives only high and low stock prices for a year, we take the mid-point of the
two values.  We then multiply that figure by the estimated number of outstanding shares (legal
capital divided by the customary par value of 50 yen).
Because many analysts believe that the zaibatsu groups manipulated capital markets to
their advantage, we add dummy variables for zaibatsu affiliation. More specifically, we add
dummy variables for each of the four principal zaibatsu groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
and Yasuda-Asano), a dummy for all other zaibatsu (the Furukawa, Kawasaki, Nissan, Nihon
                    
63 On legal capital, see note x, supra; on bank debt, see note x, supra.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 24
Chisso, and Mori groups), and a dummy indicating whether a firm was in any of the groups (Any
Zaibatsu).  In identifying zaibatsu affiliation, we rely on Asajima.
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Table 8 gives selected summary statistics.  For reference, note the trend in per capita
GNP during this period (in constant 1934-36 yen):
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1895 139 1919 209
1900 141 1926 208
1905 145 1931 213
1910 158 1936 268
1915 160 1940 318
As the trend shows, the 1920s were years of economic stagnation in Japan.
2.  The tests. -- We report below the results of several tests.  First, to examine the relation
between bank debt and stock prices, we divide market capitalization by firm equity.  We then
regress that ratio on a variety of accounting measures (Tables 9, 10A and 11).  We had hoped to
use Tobin’s Q, but could obtain neither the market value of the firm’s debt nor the replacement
cost of the firm’s assets.
Second, to examine the effect of bank debt on firm growth, we regress the growth in a
firm’s asset base from one period to the next over the firm’s financials in the first period (Table
10B).  In other words, we regress 1919-26 growth (defined as [1926 gross assets]/[1919 gross
assets]) on 1919 financials, 1926-31 growth (similarly defined) on 1926 financials, and so forth.
Last, to avoid the possibility that unobserved facets of managerial ability might correlate with
levels of bank debt, we regress the change in the market-capitalization over equity for each firm
on the change in its leverage and asset base (Table 11).
As explanatory variables, we focus on two financial measures.  First, we use the bank-
debt/gross-assets and bonds/gross-assets ratios for each firm.  Second, we use a firm’s total
leverage, defined as 1 less the ratio of a firm’s equity to its gross assets.  The first variable (bank-
debt/gross-assets) obviously focuses more precisely on the isssue at stake in this study.
Unfortunately, the accounting category we translate as bank debt (shakunyukin) probably
includes modest amounts of non-bank debt, and for some firms may exclude some amounts
owed directly to banks as well.  Accordingly, we use the total leverage figure as a check against
the chance of such error.
For the Table 9 regressions, we segregate the data by year, while for Table 10 we pool
the data sets -- a practice consistent with Jennifer Frankl’s recent study of zaibatsu profitability.
In Tables 9 and 11 we add industry dummies; in Table 10 we add industry dummies, and year
dummies.  In the interests of space, we do not report the coefficient estimates.  In all regressions
we calculate but do not report a constant term.
                    
64 The leading alternative classifications are those of Kamekichi Takahashi, Nippon zaibatsu no kaibo [An
Anatomy of Japanese Zaibatsu] (Tokyo:  Chuo koron sha, 1930), and Mochikabu gaisha seiri iinkai, Nihon zaibatsu
to sono kaitai [The Japanese Zaibatsu and their Dissolution] (Tokyo:  Mochikabu gaisha seiri iinkai, 1951).  We also
ran these regressions using their classifications, and generally obtained similar results.  Takahashi’s classification is
plausible, but we believe the SCAP classification (dating from 1946) is too far removed in time to be appropriate
here.
65 Ohkawa, et al. (1974), supra note, at tab. 32.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 25
Table 8:  Corporate Finance -- Selected Summary Statistics
A.  Financial Values (Pooled Sample):
  Minimum     Mean    Maximum
Equity 1,322 47,441   572,313
Bonds     0  6,085   340,000
Bank debt     0  6,775   752,802
Gross assets 2,218 78,712 1,723,987
Total leverage  .001   .355      .941
Bank debt/gross assets     0   .071      .797
Market cap/Equity  .065  1.087     3.002
B.  Zaibatsu Membership:
Mitsui 0 .076 1
Mitsubishi 0 .028 1
Sumitomo 0 .021 1
Yasuda 0 .014 1
Other 0 .049 1
C.  Number of Firms:
                    1919      1926      1931      1936      1941
Steel machinery 13 13  9 14 41
Chemicals 10 10  7 15 16
Textiles 14 18 20 21 23
Food & paper  6  9  9  5  8
Mining  7  6  7  9 12
Sugar  8  8  7  6  4
Note:  Total leverage is equal to 1 - (equity/gross-assets).
Sources: Osakaya shoten, Kabushiki nenkan [Stock Annual]
(Osaka:  various publishers, various years); Shoichi Asajima,
“Daikigyo no shikin chotatsu [Capital Raising Among Large Firms,”
in Tsunehiko Yui & Eisuke Daito, eds., Nihon keiei shi 3:  Dai
kigyo jidai no torai [History of Japanese Management, 3:  The
Advent of the Age of the Large Firm] 227-34 (Tokyo:  Iwanami
shoten, 1995).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 26
Table 9:  Corporate Finance -- Regressions by Year
A.  Using Bank Debt/Gross Assets:
Dependent     1919     1926     1931     1936 1941
variable:    MktCap/Eq    MktCap/Eq    MktCap/Eq   MktCap/Eq  MktCap/Eq
.                                                                                         .
Bank dt/Gr asts -1.343 (0.97) -.340 (0.48) -1.109 (2.21) -.665 (0.80) -.763 (3.85)
Bonds/Gr assets  2.377 (1.68) -2.41 (3.53) -1.120 (2.59) -.822 (0.73)  .838 (2.07)
Gross assets   .125 (0.47)  .407 (3.08)   .190 (1.93)  .196 (2.46)  .026 (2.21)
Mitsui   .038 (0.16)  .343 (1.93)   .343 (2.27)  .184 (1.18)  .381 (3.21)
Mitsubishi    dropped -.163 (0.31)  -.000 (0.00)  .434 (1.70)  .163 (1.36)
Sumitomo    dropped dropped  dropped  .438 (1.04)  .420 (3.06)
Yasuda  -.201 (0.41) -.392 (1.12)   .076 (0.26) -.048 (0.15) -.050 (0.30)
Other zaibatsu   .306 (0.73)  .732 (2.12)   .407 (1.59)  .254 (1.22)  .001 (0.01)
Industry dummies    yes    yes     yes     yes     yes
n:      47     56      55      61      93
Adjusted R2:    0.18   0.36    0.17    0.08    0.34
B.  Using Total Leverage:
Dependent     1919     1926     1931     1936 1941
variable:    MktCap/Eq    MktCap/Eq    MktCap/Eq   MktCap/Eq  MktCap/Eq
.                                                                                         .
Total leverage -.334 (0.44) -.819 (2.19) -.772 (3.01) -.899 (2.41) .230 (1.06)
Gross assets  .235 (0.87)  .403 (2.87)  .224 (2.30)  .217 (2.85) .019 (1.38)
Mitsui  .139 (0.59)  .295 (1.56)  .367 (2.41)  .223 (1.51) .362 (3.86)
Mitsubishi   dropped -.012 (0.02)  .094 (0.22)  .579 (2.36) .180 (1.35)
Sumitomo   dropped   dropped   dropped  .470 (1.19) .449 (3.00)
Yasuda  .056 (0.13) -.463 (1.26)  .009 (0.03) -.108 (0.37) .032 (0.18)
Other zaibatsu  .525 (1.28)  .643 (1.75)  .404 (1.57)  .367 (1.86) .119 (0.84)
Industry dummies    yes     yes     yes     yes    yes
n:      47      56      55      61      93
Adjusted R2:    0.13    0.27    0.17    0.18   0.20
Notes:  All regressions use OLS.  We give coefficients, followed by the absolute
value of the t-statistics in parenthesis.  Total leverage is equal to 1 - (equity/gross-
assets).  In Panel A, the independent financial variables are for the same year as the
dependent variable, and the coefficients for gross assets are multiplied by 100,000.  In
Panel B, total leverage is for the period preceding the dependent variable.  Thus, where
1919-26 Growth is the dependent variable, the leverage is for 1919.  Coefficients for
industry dummies and a constant term were calculated but are not reported.
Sources:  See Table 8.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 27
Table 10:  Corporate Finance -- Regressions on Pooled Sample
A.  Market Capitalization/Equity:
Dependent Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq.
variable:                                                                           .
Bank debt/Gross assets -.807 (3.51) -.841 (3.66)
Bonds/Gross assets -.677 (2.40) -.704 (2.50)
Total leverage -.504 (3.35) -.466 (3.07)
Gross assets  .051 (2.77)  .050 (2.70)  .054 (2.85)  .051 (2.70)
Mitsui  .280 (3.95)  .302 (4.22)
Mitsubishi  .319 (2.24)  .431 (3.01)
Sumitomo  .595 (2.87)  .562 (2.69)
Yasuda -.056 (0.41) -.115 (0.84)
Other zaibatsu  .301 (2.75)  .332 (3.00)
Any zaibatsu  .268 (4.61)  .289 (4.89)
  
Industry dummies     yes     yes     yes     yes
Year dummies     yes     yes     yes     yes
n     312     312     312     312
Adjusted R2:     .45     .44     .44     .43
B.  Firm Growth:
Dependent    Growth      Growth     Growth     Growth
variable:                                                                           .
  
Bank-debt/Gross assets  .190 (0.18)   .094 (0.09)
Bonds/Gross assets -1.56 (1.66) -1.465 (1.57)
Total leverage -1.062 (2.06) -.989 (1.92)
Mitsui  .016 (0.07)   .053 (0.24)
Mitsubishi  .215 (0.39)   .320 (0.59)
Sumitomo  .100 (0.12)   .073 (0.09)
Yasuda  .053 (0.12)   .044 (0.10)
Other zaibatsu  .827 (2.23)   .867 (2.34)
Any zaibatsu     .163 (0.84)  .196 (1.01)
Industry dummies      yes      yes      yes     yes
Year dummies      yes      yes      yes     yes
n      210      210      210     210
Adjusted R2:      .15      .15      .16     .16
Notes:  All regressions use OLS.  We give coefficients, followed by the absolute
value of the t-statistics in parenthesis. Total leverage is equal to 1 -
(equity/gross-assets).  In Panel A the independent financial variables are for the
same year as the dependent variable, and the coefficients on gross assets are
multiplied by 100,000.  In Panel B the independent financial variables are for the
period preceding the dependent variable.  Thus, where 1919-26 Growth is the dependent
variable, the independent variables are for 1919, and so forth.  Coefficients for
industry dummies, year dummies, and a constant term were calculated but are not
reported.
Sources:  See Table 8.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 28
Table 11: Corporate Finance --
Difference Equations with Pooled Sample
Dependent Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq. Mkt Cap./Eq
variable:                  (t2 - t1)      (t2 - t1)      (t2 - t1)      (t2 - t1)..
Bank dt/Gr asts (t2 - t1) -2.950 (4.24) -2.875 (4.21)
Bonds/Gross asts(t2 - t1)  2.803 (3.30)  2.754 (.837)
Total leverage (t2 - t1)  -.266 (0.37)  -.232 (0.33)
Gross assets (t2 - t1)  -.116 (1.07)  -.132 (1.29)  -.169 (1.41)  -.187 (1.65)
Mitsui   .757 (3.12)   .649 (2.49)
Mitsubishi  -.045 (0.08)   .140 (0.21)
Sumitomo   .969 (0.82)   .498 (0.39)
Yasuda   .308 (0.67)   .274 (0.55)
Other zaibatsu   .509 (1.16)   .388 (0.82)   .184 (0.61)
Any zaibatsu   .619 (2.88)
  
Industry dummies      yes      yes      yes      yes
n      180      180      180      180
Adjusted R2:      .15      .15      .00      .02
Notes:  All regressions use OLS.  We give coefficients, followed by the absolute
value of the t-statistics in parenthesis.  For market capitalization/equity, bank
debt/gross assets, bonds/gross assets, total leverage, and gross assets, we use the
change in these values over succeeding periods.  Total leverage is equal to 1 -
(equity/gross-assets).  The coefficients on gross assets are multiplied by 100,000.
Coefficients for industry dummies and a constant term were calculated but are not
reported.
Sources:  See Table 8.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3.  The results. -- (a) Market capitalization.  None of the regressions suggests investors
found bank debt advantageous.  Take the regressions using stock market capitalization (Table 9).
In the regressions using bank-debt/gross-assets (Table 9A), the coefficient on bank debt is
negative for all five years and significantly negative for two; in the regressions using total
leverage (Table 9B), the coefficient on leverage is negative for four of the five years and
significantly negative for three:  firm size held constant, the more heavily a firm borrwed from
banks, the lower its ratio of market capitalization to equity.  The regressions on pooled data
(Table 10A) confirm this ngative relation between market valuation and leverage.
(b) Growth.  The regressions using firm growth (Table 10) produce similar results.  In
general, one would expect the more successful firms both to enjoy higher share prices and to
grow more rapidly than their competitors.  As a result, if bank debt does not increase share prices
one would not expect it to increase growth rates either.  Consistent with such an account, the
coefficient of bank-debt/gross-assets is insignificant in Table 10B; the coefficient on total
leverage is significantly negative.
In separate unreported regressions, we use the Table 9 year-specific data sets to regress
growth rates on firm financials. We also run the growth regressions with gross assets as anMiwa & Ramseyer:  Page 29
additional right-hand-side variable,
66 and run all our regressions without the zaibatsu variables.
In no case do we find any evidence that either bank debt or total leverage increases either market
capitalization or growth rates.
(c) Difference equations.  The possibility remains, however, that leverage somehow
correlates with an unobserved facet of managerial talent (or some other unobserved variation
among firms).  For example, Table 9 and 10 seem to suggest that leverage decreases market
valuation.  Yet perhaps these results reflect the fact that the least sophisticated managers
disproportionately relied on bank loans, while their more sophisticated competitors raised capital
through more complex avenues.  If so, then the negative coefficients on bank debt and total
leverage could reflect that difference in managerial talent rather than any effect of the leverage
itself.
To address this potentially confounding effect, we estimate equations in first differences:
we regress the change in a firm’s market capitalization/equity ratio over changes in leverage.  As
Table 11 shows, the coefficient on total leverage is insignificant.  The effect of bank debt,
however, is significantly negative:  all else equal, if a given firm increases its bank borrowings
its market capitalization will fall.
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C.  Zaibatsu and Firm Performance:
1.  The question of zaibatsu success. -- But what of zaibatsu affiliation?  Table for now
the prime question -- whether the zaibatsu gave their manufacturing firms a competitive edge by
routing them preferential access to funds.  Start instead with the preliminary inquiry -- were the
zaibatsu firms in fact more successful than their competitors?  Pre-war journalists, occupation-
era analysts, and contemporary historians have all claimed that they were.  Yet economists who
have attempted serious empirical studies report mixed results.
On the one hand, Jennifer Frankl regressed several performance measures on zaibatsu
affiliation to relatively little effect.  Using financial data on 130 firms for 1915, 1921, 1927, 1932
and 1937, she asked whether zaibatsu firms had higher profit-revenue ratios, price-earnings
ratios, profit-asset ratios, returns to equity, or sales growth.  For the principal zaibatsu (groups
like the Mitsui and Mitsubishi) she obtained no significant coefficients.  Only for the “new
zaibatsu” (groups like Nissan, often with close military ties) did she find a significant positive
connection.
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On the other hand, when Tetsuji Okazaki regressed profitability over zaibatsu affiliation,
he discovered a stronger relationship.  Okazaki used Kabushiki nenkan and individual firm
accounting report data on 135 large firms from a variety of industries (unlike us, he does not
restrict his sample to manufacturing firms) from 1922 to 1936, but did not distinguish among the
zaibatsu groups.  Using industry dummies, he found significant evidence that zaibatsu
membership led to better performance in both the 1922-26 and the 1932-36 periods.
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66 We omitted gross assets from the RHS in our principal regressions because it also appears in the
denominator on the LHS.
67 Good arguments could be made that we should include time dummies, or replace the change in gross
assets variable with the firm’s gross assets in time 2.  We have done so, but the regression results do not
substantially change.
68 Frankl, supra note.
69 Tetsuji Okazaki, Mochikabu gaisha no rekishi -- zaibatsu to kigyo tochi [A History of the Holding
Company:  Zaibatsu and Corporate Governanace] (Tokyo:  Chikuma shobo, 1999).Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 30
As our regressions show, we find that zaibatsu firms did outperform their rivals.  First, in
Table 9 the Mitsui firms had significantly higher market-capitalization-to-equity ratios in 1926,
1931 and 1941, the Mitsubishi had a significantly higher ratio in 1936, the Sumitomo in 1941,
and the “other zaibatasu” (like Nissan) in 1926 and 1936.  In the Table 10A regressions on
pooled data, the coefficients on zaibatsu affiliation are significantly positive for all except the
Yasuda.  In 10B the “other zaibatsu” firms experienced significantly higher growth rates.
Given the variation among the regressions, we suspect the issue of zaibatsu performance
is sensitive to the regression specifications, firms, industries, and years included.  In particular,
we suspect that the years covered may explain some of the differences among our, Okazaki’s and
Frankl’s results.  Although Frankl found no evidence that the traditional zaibatsu outperformed
the non-zaibatsu firms, she closed her inquiry in 1937.  By contrast, we obtain some of our more
compelling evidence from 1936 and 1941, and Okazaki similarly finds some of his strongest
results from the late 1930s.
2.  The relation between zaibatsu success and banks. -- (a) The effect of finance.  So,
zaibatsu firms were more successful than their rivals -- the question is what to make of this.  Did
zaibatsu firms succeed because their affiliated banks routed them funds preferentially?  As noted
earlier, SCAP and the historians have argued that they did.  In fact, they did not.  First, as we
find both in the Tables 9 and 10 regressions and in other unreported regressions without zaibatsu
variables, the firms that borrowed heavily did not do well.  The zaibatsu firms could not have
succeeded because they borrowed, because the firms that succeeded were not the borrowing kind.
Second, zaibatsu firms did not borrow heavily anyway.  To illustrate the point, we take
the pooled data base, and regress bank debt on zaibatsu affiliation, gross assets, and year and
industry dummies.  Through this exercise, we obtain the following coefficients and t-statistics (in
parentheses):
Mitsui   -8040 (1.73)
Mitsubishi -24933 (2.55)
Sumitomo      496 (0.04)
Yasuda   -9205 (0.98)
Other zaibatsu -20445 (2.89)
with an adjusted R2 of .56.  If we use one dummy to capture membership in any of the zaibatsu,
we generate a coefficient and t-statistic of -11855 (3.14), with an adjusted R2 of .56.  The
zaibatsu did not borrow more than other firms.  Instead, they borrowed less.
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Third, some of the most successful pre-war enterprises were enterprises without affiliated
banks.  Take the Suzuki trading empire.  A turn-of-the-century upstart, the Suzuki group grew
with phenomenal speed.  By 1917 its trading firm had sales of 1.5 billion yen to the Mitsui
trading firm’s 1.1 to 1.2 billion.  By the mid-1920s, the group revolved around two trading firms
that directly controlled 35 others and more indirectly another 30.  All told, it controlled paid-in
                    
70 To be sure, what they borrowed they may have obtained from affiliated firms.  Yutaka Kasuga, Mitsui
zaibatsu [The Mitsui Zaibatsu], in Shoichi Asajima, ed., Zaibatsu kin’yu kozo on hikaku kenkyu [A Comparative
Study of Zaibatsu Financial Structure] 56-57 (Tokyo:  Ochanomizu shobo, 1987), collected data for six Mitsui firms
for several years:  Oji Paper borrowed an average of 88 percent of its loans from other Mitsui affiliated firms
(including the bank) over eight years from 1931 to 1940; Toshiba borrowed 82 percent over 10 years; Kanebo
borrowed 76 percent over 3 years; Nihon Steel borrowed 74 percent 7 years; Denki kagaku borrowed 74 percent
over 8 years; and Dai-Nippon Celluloid borrowed 100 percent over 3 years.  What they borrowed, they may well
have borrowed from the affiliated financial firms; they simply did not borrow very much.Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 31
capital of 239 million yen to the Sumitomo’s 188 million yen.
71  And all this it did without a
bank.  Or take the Nissan group, generally called one of the “new zaibatsu.”  From modest turn-
of-the-century mining roots, it too expanded quickly.  By the mid-1930s it controlled paid-in
capital of 470 million yen to the Sumitomo’s 380 million.  Again, it did this without a bank.
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(b) Zaibatsu bank policy.  Directly contrary to the received wisdom, moreover, the
zaibatsu banks deliberately tried to limit their loans to affiliated firms.  Unfortunately, firm
financials only haphazardly list the identity of the lenders, and bank histories only haphazardly
identify borrowers.  Nonetheless, through several disparate sources we can reconstruct the
following accounts.
Mitsui.  From the central Mitsui firms, the Mitsui Bank took more than it lent.  And from
them it did take massive deposits.  During 1923-34 (in semi-annual accounting periods), from its
five key firms (the holding company and the trading, mining, trust, and life insurance companies)
it obtained 5 to 16 percent of its entire deposit base.  It then lent these firms substantially less.
From 1923 to 1934, in only one six-month period (the second half of 1923) did it lend these
firms more than they deposited.  The lowest ratio of loans to deposits came in the first half of
1934, when these firms borrowed back only 26 percent of their deposits.  The mean of the semi-
annual ratios came to 71 percent.  Even if we include the 17 next-tier Mitsui firms, the bank lent
this group of 22 in 1939 (the only year on which we have data) only slightly more (112 percent)
than the amount they collectively deposited.
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Because it found it so hard to locate good borrowers, by policy the Mitsui Bank restricted
the deposits it took.  Rightly seen as safe, during the 1920s it faced a large influx of deposits
from other banks.  Had it tried to route funds to affiliated firms, it would have welcomed the new
money.  Instead, it actively discouraged it, first by cutting the interest it paid other banks and
later by simply restricting new deposits.
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Sumitomo.  After its public stock offering in 1917, the Sumitomo Bank was no longer
exclusively a creature of the zaibatsu (as of 1928, Sumitomo affiliates held 56 percent of its
stock).
75  Yet already in 1902 the Bank had stipulated by contract that it would pay the Sumitomo
holding company no higher an interest rate on its deposits than it paid anyone else, and
demanded that the company provide security for all loans above 300,000 yen.  More informally,
it declared that it would never lend the holding company more than 10 percent of its deposit base.
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Even during the boom years of World War I, it lent the company no more than 7 percent of its
loans; from 1932 to 1939, it lent the holding company and its 14 central affiliated firms only 1 to
9 percent of all loans, or 0.8 to 6 percent of all deposits.
76
Mitsubishi and Yasuda.  Neither did the Mitsubishi bank lend its affiliated firms a large
fraction of its total loans.  From 1926 to 1937, the holding company and 8 central affiliated
Mitsubishi firms borrowed (from all sources) a combined 19 to 76 million yen.  For any given
year, these amounts were equivalent only to 5 to 12 percent of all loans made by the Mitsubishi
financial firms, or to 8 to 22 percent of all loans made by the Mitsubishi Bank.
77  I n te r na l
company documents indicate, moreover, that the Mitsubishi life insurance company (Meiji
seimei) loaned no funds at all to Mitsubishi-affiliated firms.
78  Unfortunately, we lack
comparable data on the Yasuda zaibatsu.  Crucially, the group included relatively few non-
financial firms.
(c) Restating the question.  The zaibatsu firms did not succeed because of any special
access to bank debt.  Yet perhaps to ask why they succeeded -- perhaps that very question
misstates the issues.  Fundamentally, these firms did not succeed because they were zaibatsu
firms; they were zaibatsu firms because they succeeded, and they succeeded for all the various
reasons some firms succeed in competitive markets while others fail.  More precisely, journalists
and social commentators named these firms zaibatsu in the late 1920s because they were at the
time making their investors very rich.
Put differently, the zaibatsu firms differed from other firms only ex post.  Ex ante, in the
mid-19th century many rich families resembled the Mitsui and Sumitomo.
79  In the transition to
the new Meiji government, most lost their fortunes.  If they survived the transition, most lost
their fortunes during the next two decades.
Scholars sometimes claim that the zaibatsu succeeded because of government patronage,
but even this did not distinguish the zaibatsu ex ante.  True, in the 1870s the Mitsui house
provided the new national and prefectural governments various exchequer and tax-collecting
services, but so did the Ono and Shimada houses.  In the 1920s the Mitsui and Mitsubishi bought
politicians, but so did the Suzuki trading empire.
Even as late as the turn of the century, many firms resembled closely the ones that would
become the zaibatsu.  The Suzuki empire, for example, at the time was rapidly amassing both
financial wealth and political connections.  The Konoike house had built on its centuries-old
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sake-brewing and money-changing experience to branch into fields like shipping and financial
services.  By the early 20th century, it boasted one of the most powerful banks in the country.
What distinguished the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda from all these other
groups was a fact only observable ex post:  in the 1920s and 1930s they were doing well where
the others were not.  The Ono and Shimada did not survive the 1870s.  The Suzuki did not
survive the 1920s.  The Konoike survived (merging its bank into what would become the Sanwa
Bank), but with no panache.  In the Japanese economy from 1870 to 1930 as in all competitive
economies, many firms failed while some survived and a few thrived.  What distinguished the
Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda (as well as firms like Nissan) was that they were
making their investors rich in the late 1920s when muckraking journalists came looking for them.
The term itself is one that journalists invented as a variation on others they were already
using.  In the late 19th century, military and political leaders sometimes had shown regional
loyalties.  When they did, journalists and commentators had called the resulting groups
“hanbatsu” -- or “domainal factions.”  When the military tried to manipulate the government,
they had written about the “gunbatsu” -- or “military factions.”  And when wealthy industrialists
seemed to buy political influence, they coined a term for them too.  “Zaibatsu” -- or “wealth
factions” -- was the result.
At root, academics take (and SCAP officers took) the concept of zaibatsu far too
seriously.
80  As used by its contemporaries, the idiomatic translation of zaibatsu was nothing so
serious as “conglomerate,” “corporate group,” or even “financial clique.”  It was “robber baron.”
Although one can find an occasional reference to the term in the 1910s, as economic historian
Haruhito Takeda notes its widespread use dates only from the 1930s in essays by populist
journalists.
81  These writers had no analytic category in mind.  Instead, they simply wanted a
catchy pejorative term.
And a catchy term it was.  As it caught on, business leaders increasingly found their
flexibility hampered by public and government pressure.  Whether on the left or on the right but
particularly on the right, zealots were outraged by what they saw as zaibatsu greed.  The “Blood
Pledge Corps” acted first, and in 1932 shot and killed both an ex-finance minister and the Mitsui
CEO.  Police found another Mitsui and three Mitsubishi executives on the hit list.  Two months
later, renegade military officers killed the prime minister and tried to bomb the Mitsubishi Bank.
By then zaibatsu leaders resisted the fascists at their peril, and they knew it.
Given this etymology, to ask why the zaibatsu succeeded invents a problem where none
exists.  In the second half of the 19th century, some would-be industrialists had wealth, some had
drive, some had talent, and some had luck.  The few with a combination of several of these
attributes made money; many others lost it.  Those that made it diversified their wealth into
several industries, and augmented or at least protected those investments by currying favor with
politicians.  When they did, journalists and commentators called them the “zaibatsu.”
IV.  Conclusions:
Modern finance theory puts stringent demands on banks.  Gerschenkron did too, of
course.  But behind the roles assigned banks in the current literature lies a theoretical apparatus
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far more involved than anything Gerschenkron himself ever described.  That banks would
promote economic growth is an idea he indeed pioneered.  But in the four decades since,
theorists have expanded that role to formidable levels.
Modern theorists assign banks a pivotal role in reducing the inefficiencies that stem from
informational asymmetries in capital markets.  In the words of Charles Calomiris and Carlos
Ramirez, “[t]he role of intermediaries comes from the advantages of appointing specialists to
transfer funds, screen applicants, monitor managerial performance and company profits, and
design and enforce specific contractual covenants that discipline managers.”
82
This is a tall order.  Modern banks are huge firms accustomed to operating in severely
regulated environments.  Big organizations in heavily regulated sectors anywhere are seldom
paragons of innovation and efficiency.  Bankers anywhere are seldom among the suspects one
would usually round up as specialists in monitoring managerial performance or in designing
contractual covenants to discipline managers.
Perhaps it is a tall order banks seldom need to fill, for perhaps the problems they face are
not as severe as we sometimes think.  After all, empiricists have trouble finding much evidence
of informational asymmetries.  Even in the life and automobile insurance markets, they find less
evidence of such asymmetries than one might suppose.
83
But table that question.  Regardless of whether it is a tall order banks would do well to
fill if they could, perhaps it simply is not an order they can fill.  We find no evidence here that
ties to a bank improve performance.  In related research, we found no evidence that turn-of-the-
century Japanese spinning firms did better for having bank-affiliated directors on their board.
84
Paulet finds no evidence that the key 19th century French universal bank Credit Mobilier
monitored its debtors or eased liquidity constraints.
85  And Caroline Fohlin finds no connection
between bank loans and investment patterns at the very heart of Gerschenkron’s thesis -- in turn-
of-the-century Germany.  Instead, she concludes:
86
attachment [to a German universal bank] is not associated with dramatic
reductions in firms’ liquidity sensitivity of investment.  ...  Furthermore, firms
with long-term bank relationships ... experienced no generalizable reduction in
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liquidity sensitivity[, and] bank attachment is not associated with high rates of
investment.
Indeed, perhaps we should simply soften the dichotomy between the roles of banks and
capital markets in economic growth.  Recent cross-country comparisons suggest that real-world
bank and stock markets grow in tandom.  As Ash Demirguec-Kunt and Ross Levine put it,
“countries with better-developed stock markets also have better-developed banks and nonbank
financial intermediaries.”
87  By the World Bank’s indicators of stock market development, Japan
and Germany -- those supposed bastions of relationship-banking -- rank second and third (after
Hong Kong).  The U.K. and the U.S. trail fourth and fifth.
88
In the end, perhaps the bank-driven tales of German and Japanese growth describe the
histories of neither.  They certainly do not describe the history of Japan.  Japanese firms did not
grow through bank domination, firms with close ties to banks did not enjoy a competitive
advantage, and the great zaibatsu groups did not use their banks in order to manipulate capital
markets and skew funds to their affiliated manufacturing firms.  The story of pre-war Japanese
corporate finance is not a story about relationship banking.  It is a story about firms that
overwhelmingly raised funds through decentralized, competitive capital markets.
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